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Credit expansion, capital adequacy ratios 
 and the stability of the banking sector in Ukraine 
Executive Summary 
In recent years, bank loans expanded rapidly in Ukraine. Regulatory capital of banks has 
also increased, but at a much lower pace. As a result, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
for the aggregated banking sector dropped significantly and stood at 14.8% as of 
September 2005. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) does not publish information 
regarding CARs for different groups of banks. But there are good grounds to believe that 
CAR for the group of the ten largest banks in Ukraine is considerably lower than 14.8% 
and might stand below 12%, which is not far away from the minimum of 10% set by the 
NBU. 
Should this estimation be correct, then we should consider this situation as rather 
dangerous. Likely events such as a drop in real estate prices, an economic recession or 
political instability in the context of parliamentary elections in March 2006 would further 
lower the CARs. As a result, the ratios for the group of large banks could get near or 
even below 10%, thus jeopardizing the stability of the banking sector. The problem will 
most certainly not be solved by banks themselves; most large banks are for sale and 
bank owners have no incentives to inject new capital or to restrain lending. 
Consequently, it is for the NBU to take action and prevent a further deterioration of 
CARs. 
In our view, the NBU should take the following steps to prevent a further decline in CARs. 
Firstly, the NBU should inform banks about its concern regarding the recent trend 
towards low CARs. Banks should be required to take the necessary measures to improve 
the situation. Secondly, the NBU should introduce and publish an “administrative 
practice”, by which it considers banks with CARs below 12% as particularly risky. Such 
banks should be asked to explain the reasons for the low CARs and face frequent on-site 
inspections. As shown by German experience, such “soft” measures can be pretty 
effective. But if for any reason they turn out to be ineffective in Ukraine, then the NBU 
should consider the use of “hard” measures such as raising the minimum CAR to 12%. 
Contents 
1. Introduction 
2. Credit expansion and decreasing capital adequacy ratios 
3. Lower capital adequacy ratios and the stability of the banking sector 
4. How should the NBU react in view of lower capital adequacy ratios? 
5. Conclusion and recommendations 
 
  
 
2
1 Introduction 
In recent years, an impressive credit expansion has taken place in Ukraine. Most 
observers and policy makers welcome this development and hope for a continuation of 
this trend. Other experts believe that the expansion has been too fast and that it entails 
significant risks for the banking sector. Consequently, they demand decisive action by 
the banking supervision to avoid risking a banking crisis in the future. 
In this paper we study the effect of credit expansion on the stability of the banking sector 
by looking at the recent development of capital adequacy ratios (CARs), a key indicator 
for a bank's solvency. Part 2 describes the credit expansion and the decrease in CARs 
since 2001. In Part 3 we ask whether the observed decrease in CARs poses a significant 
risk for banking stability. Part 4 entails our recommendations to tackle the problems 
involved with lower CARs, while Part 5 concludes. 
2 Credit expansion and decreasing capital adequacy ratios 
Ukraine's economic growth has been pretty high in recent years. In this environment, the 
demand for commercial loans has soared and banks have increased their provision of 
loans considerably (see Table 1).  
Table 1 
GDP growth and credit expansion 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* 
Real GDP growth (in %) 9.2 5.2 9.4 12.1 3.5 
Real credit** growth (in %) 34.4 47.8 55.2 18.9 15.5 
Source: Derzhkomstat, IMF. 
*Estimation. 
**Real credit to nongovernment, deflated by CPI. 
During this process of credit expansion, banks have also increased their capital in 
absolute terms. However, the increase of the banks’ own funds has been less strong than 
the expansion of credit. As a result, capital in relative terms has decreased significantly. 
From 2001 to September 2005, the “capital adequacy ratio” (regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets, CAR) of the aggregated banking sector has gone down from 20.7% to 
14.8%. The “capital to assets ratio” (balance sheet capital to total assets), a further 
indicator for the appropriateness of capital, decreased during the same period from 
15.6% to 11.5% (see Graph 1). 
A look at disaggregated data for the capital to assets ratio reveals significant differences 
between groups of banks (see Graph 2). The ratio for the group of ten largest banks, 
which accounts for 55% of total bank assets, is 8.99%. This is   21.8% (or 2.51 
percentage points) lower than the aggregated figure (11.5%). On top, the time series 
available for this ratio divulges a massive worsening for the ratio of the largest banks; 
from January to October 2005 the ratio declined from 10.73% to 8.99%. 
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Graph 1 
Ukraine's banking sector capital in relative terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Ukraine. 
Graph 2 
Capital to assets ratio by groups of banks (as of 01.10.2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Ukraine. 
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Unfortunately, the NBU does not publish disaggregated data for CARs. But given the 
conceptual similarities between CAR and the capital to assets ratio, as well as the parallel 
development in recent years (see Figure 1), we can conclude that CAR for the group of 
ten largest banks is most likely to be significantly smaller than the aggregate figure of 
14.8%. Assuming that CAR for the ten largest banks is also 21.8% lower than the 
aggregate number, as is the case for the similar indicator “capital to assets“, then the 
CAR for the ten largest banks amounts to 11.57%, which is clearly below 12%. 
3 Lower capital adequacy ratios and the stability of the banking sector 
The capital adequacy ratio is a key indicator for a bank's solvency and for the assessment 
of the stability in the banking sector. While there has been a considerable decrease in 
aggregate CAR in Ukraine in the recent past, the current level of 14.8% in itself cannot 
be considered as too low. After all, the minimum CAR set by the NBU is 10%, leaving a 
reasonable (though not huge) buffer of 4.8 percentage points (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
CAR buffers in selected countries 
Country Buffer Actual CAR Min. CAR 
Argentina -2.67 8.83 11.50 
Azerbaijan 12.20 22.20 10.00 
Belarus 10.20 24.20 14.00 
Brazil 5.40 16.40 11.00 
Bulgaria 19.14 31.14 12.00 
Croatia 8.50 18.50 10.00 
Estonia 5.00 15.00 10.00 
Germany 2.60 10.60 8.00 
Hungary 7.64 15.64 8.00 
Philippines 4.53 14.53 10.00 
Poland 7.10 15.10 8.00 
Romania 16.80 28.80 12.00 
Russia 10.30 20.30 10.00 
Singapore 6.40 18.40 12.00 
Ukraine 4.80 14.80 10.00 
USA 4.85 12.85 8.00 
Venezuela 5.79 17.79 12.00 
Source: The World Bank (2003-2004), National Bank of Ukraine (2005). 
The situation looks much worse, once we shift our attention to the CAR of the group of 
ten large banks in Ukraine, for which we estimated a value below 12%.  
The CAR buffer of less than 2 percentage points compares unfavourable with the practice 
in most countries (see Table 2), even taking into account that large banks can feature 
lower CARs than the aggregated sector. Furthermore, this low buffer is particularly 
worrying, as it is kept in good economic times. Negative economic developments – even 
external developments out of control of policy makers in Ukraine – may force the CARs of 
Ukrainian large banks below the 10%-threshold.  
There are internal threats to the Ukrainian banking sector that should trouble us even 
more: Bad loans could become widespread in the near future. There are mainly two 
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reasons that justify the existence of this possibility. First, a rapid credit expansion as in 
the recent past often goes along with inappropriate internal risk assessments. Second, 
prices for real estate have skyrocketed; it is likely that the developments on the real-
estate market show signs of a “bubble”1. If prices for real estate drop considerably, this 
will lower the value of collateral and lead to an increase of bad loans in the banking 
sector. In addition, some observers note that banks’ own funds has been increased by 
questionable revaluations of assets, which could indicate an even bigger problem than 
shown by the official figures. This is partly due to selling intentions of owners of large 
banks. 
To sum up, it is reasonable to conclude that large banks in Ukraine are behaving in a 
risky fashion and might not be able to defend the critical 10% CAR in case of an 
economic recession or political instabilities in the context of parliamentary elections in 
March 2006. Consequently, the recent credit expansion has indeed increased the risks in 
the banking sector. 
4 How should the NBU react in view of lower capital adequacy ratios? 
The presently low CARs within the group of ten largest banks and possible instabilities in 
the near future pose a threat to the financial sector and the Ukrainian economy alike. 
Therefore, policy makers should be interested in seeing Ukrainian banks, especially the 
larger ones, increase their CARs. Will this happen without any governmental intervention 
or measures taken by the National Bank of Ukraine? Most certainly not. After all, bank 
owners have no incentive to increase their bank’s CARs. On the contrary, bank owners 
are interested in maintaining lower CARs for two main reasons: 
Reason 1: 
Most big Ukrainian banks are for sale, following the spectacular price paid by Raiffeisen 
Bank for Aval Bank. Owners have no interest in injecting fresh money into a bank, which 
is up for sale anyway. And as market share is an important factor for the price of the 
bank and for current and future profits, they also have no incentive to restrain lending. 
Reason 2: 
Banks might believe that they do not have to fear being punished if their CARs fall below 
10%. And there are arguments backing this belief. Firstly, we are dealing with big banks. 
These are often considered as “to big to fail”; this limits the possibility of punishment for 
supervisors. And secondly, as most big banks have a low CAR, it is quite likely that 
several large banks fall below the threshold once the economic situation changes. In this 
situation the supervisors might not be able to punish such a large group of banks. 
Therefore, banks might believe that the supervision authorities will tolerate CARs below 
the required rate. They may even count on help from the NBU in times of need, as in the 
form of liquidity loans. 
Both reasons support our belief that the problem of low CARs for the group of large 
banks will not be solved by itself. Consequently, the authorities will have to stop the 
trend towards lower CARs and prevent a fall below the crucial threshold of 10%, should 
some negative events occur. But how can the authorities ensure that banks maintain 
higher CARs? We see two main possibilities: 
Possibility 1: 
The minimum CAR is kept at 10%, but the NBU informs commercial banks about its 
concern related to the low CARs of certain banks, especially the largest ones, and asks 
banks to take the NBU’s concern into account. By publishing an “administrative practice”, 
the NBU also signalises that it will see a CAR for individual banks below 12% as 
inappropriate. If banks fall short of this informal threshold, they will have to fear 
increased on-site inspections and other sanctions supervisors are able to impose. 
                                                 
1  For example, since the beginning of 2003 the average price on the secondary market per sq. 
meter for a 3-bedroom apartment in Kiev rose from USD 530 to USD 1,578 (see www.realt.ua). 
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Possibility 2: 
The National Bank can raise the minimum CAR to 12%. This is in line with recent 
recommendations by the International Monetary Fund published in November 2005. 
While the first possibility is more flexible and allows taking account for troubled banks 
and the international competitive position of Ukrainian banks, the latter is more effective. 
However, the latter does not enable the supervision authorities any flexibility with 
individual banks. 
5 Conclusion and recommendations 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is the key indicator for a bank’s solvency. For the 
aggregated Ukrainian banking sector, CAR stands at 14.8%, which is an appropriate 
level. But for the group of ten largest banks CAR seems to be declining rapidly and might 
currently amount to less than 12%. This would imply that large banks are keeping a 
rather thin buffer of less than 2 percentage points, given the minimum CAR of 10% in 
Ukraine. Thus, large banks seem to be behaving in a risky fashion and this poses a threat 
to overall financial sector stability. 
Given that most large banks are for sale now, owners have no incentives to increase 
CARs by injecting fresh capital or by limiting crediting. Consequently, action from the 
banking supervision is needed. We recommend that NBU publishes an “administrative 
practice”, informing banks that CARs by single banks below 12% will be considered as 
rather low, leading to frequent on-site inspections and further measures. Should this 
“soft” measure not be effective, then a rise in minimum CAR to 12% should be 
considered. The NBU should inform banks that this “harder” measure would follow, 
should the soft measure fail to show positive results by a certain date. 
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